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The  recent  demise  of  the  latest  balanced  budget  amendment  proposal 
norwithstanding,  there  is  still  ubiquitous  public  demand  for  fiscal 
responsibility  and  an  apparent  legislative  will  to  deliver  it.  There  is  no 
disputing  that  irresponsible  fiscal  policies  have  grown  the  federal  debt 
and  have  created  the  balanced-budget  mood  of  the  country.  However, 
an  amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  to  require  a  bale 
anced  budget,  which  is  presented  as  a  guarantee  of  fiscal  responsibility,  is 
merely  a  statement  of  intention  that  does  not  bring  the  nation  any 
closer  to  a  balanced  budget  and  is  not  a  solution  to  the  problems  we  seek 
to  resolve  through  budget  reform.  Moreover,  the  amendment  would 
result  in  more  economic  and  political  harm  than  benefit  to  the  United 
States.  Fiscal  responsibility  must  be  delivered  by  the  administration  and 
the  Congress  not  in  the  form  of  a  balanced  budget  amendment,  but  in 
the  form  of  an  alternative  to  the  current  federal  budget  approach. 
Responsible  fiscal  policies  have  the  dual  purpose  of  shrinking  the  federal 
debt  and  investing  in  the  nation’s  long-term  future  by  recognizing  the 
urgent  need  for  a  federal  capital  budget. 
The  experience  of  the  states  with  balanced  budget  requirements,  the 
role  of  government  debt  in  the  proper  functioning  of  the  monetary  and 
banking  system,  and  the  responsibility  of  the  federal  government  to  stae 
bilize  the  economy  merit  special  attention  in  the  balanced  budget 
debate.  Although  the  fact  that  nearly  all  states  are  required  to  balance 
their  budgets  is  frequently  stated  as  an  argument  in  support  of  the  bale 
anced  budget  amendment,  the  way  in  which  states  actually  operate 
under  this  constraint  would  suggest  the  contrary  position.  It  is  well  doe- 
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umented  that  states  resort  to  accounting  gimmicks  and  deceitful  prac- 
tices  when  balancing  their  budgets,  and  the  evidence  indicates  that 
some  simply  do  not  balance  their  budgets.  Furthermore,  nearly  all  states 
have  both  an  operating  budget,  which  is  the  budget  that  must  be  bale 
anced  annually,  and  a  capital  budget  for  long-term  investment  purposes, 
which  is  not  required  to  be  balanced  annually.  The  federal  government 
does  not  currently  have  the  option  of  a  capital  budget  to  commit  to 
long-term  investment. 
The  implications  of  a  shortfall  of  government  debt  that  would  eventually 
occur  under  a  balanced  budget  amendment  have  garnered  little  consid- 
eration  in  the  debate  to  date.  The  U.S.  economy  can  have  too  little  as 
well  as  too  much  government  debt.  The  benefits  a  government  debt  can 
provide  have  long  been  recognized  in  this  country  despite  its  general 
ethical  disapproval  of  debt  and  widespread  acceptance  of  the  idea  of  a 
balanced  federal  budget;  even  before  the  drafting  of  the  Constitution,  in 
1781  Alexander  Hamilton  wrote,  “A  national  debt,  if  it  is  not  excessive, 
will  be  to  us  a  national  blessing.” 
The  eventual  restructuring  of  the  U.S.  financial  system  would  be  a  major 
outcome  of  the  amendment.  Government  debt  is  the  major  asset  of  the 
central  bank,  the  only  asset  of  government  trust  funds,  and  an  important 
asset  of  risk-averse  institutions  and  individuals.  The  ceiling  that  a  bal- 
anced  budget  amendment  establishes  for  government  debt  would  result 
in  a  debt  below  the  minimum  required  to  finance  the  capital  develop- 
ment  of  the  nation.  Policymakers  and  economists  cannot  continue  to 
overlook  this  issue  in  the  halanced  budget  amendment  discourse. 
Finally,  a  balanced  budget  amendment  would  dramatically  inhibit  the 
ability  of  the  federal  government  to  react  to  cyclical  fluctuations  in  the 
economy.  Automatic  stabilizers,  which  would  be  eliminated  under  a  bal- 
anced  budget  amendment,  have  repeatedly  limited  the  depth  and  dura- 
tion  of  recessions  and  prevented  depressions,  Instead  of  being  able  to  use 
federal  revenue  and  expenditures  to  compensate  for  private  sector 
slumps,  the  government  would  be  obliged  to  institute  tax  increases  and 
spending  cuts,  which  would  only  exacerbate  recessions.  This  would  be 
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Charles  J.  Whalen,  Resident  Scholar  of  The  Jerome  Levy  Economics 
Institute  of  Bard  College,  presents  these  and  other  dissenting  arguments 
in  this  Pubkc  Policy  Briefi  Whalen  has  actively  engaged  in  the  discourse 
on  the  balanced  budget  amendment.  He  submitted  testimony  on  the 
proposed  amendment  to  the  Subcommittee  on  the  Constitution  of  the 
House  Judiciary  Committee.  He  also  organized  a  petition  opposing  the 
amendment  that  received  over  wo  hundred  signatures  from  economists 
and  political  scientists,  including  five  Nobel  laureates.  In  this  brief 
Whalen  illuminates  many  of  the  misconceptions  prevalent  in  the  debate 
and  highlights  some  of  the  complex  issues  conspicuously  absent  from 
recent  discussions.  He  concludes  that  the  amendment  would  be  harmful 
to  both  the  economic  and  the  political  systems  of  the  United  States. 
Whalen’s  critical  assessment  of  the  amendment  is  an  important  contris 
bution  to  the  balanced  budget  amendment  literature.  Even  though  the 
latest  proposed  amendment  failed  to  pass  in  the  recent  Senate  vote,  the 
debate  about  the  amendment  is  not  over.  The  issue  of  fiscal  responsibile 
ity  is  still  vital.  If  our  goal  is  to  achieve  fiscal  responsibility,  the  emphasis 
must  now  shift  to  a  serious  consideration  of  alternative  budget  reforms- 
consideration  of  establishing  a  federal  capital  budget  and  making  a  corns 
mitment  to  the  long-term  future  of  the  United  States. 
Dimitri  B.  Papadimitriou 
Executive  Director 
April  1995 
Tire _Iera  IVY  Economics institute of Bard Colfege  13 The  Balanced 
Budget  Amendment: 
Toxic,  Not  Tonic 
Republicans  in  the  U.S.  House  of  Representatives  unveiled  a  lo-point 
Contract  with  America  (CWA)  in  September  of  1994.  The  first  item  in 
that  legislative  agenda,  the  “Fiscal  Responsibility  Act,”  contained  a  con- 
stitutional  amendment  that  would  require  the  federal  budget  to  he  haI- 
anced  each  year.  Although  the  initial  CWA  balanced  budget  proposal 
was  defeated,  bipartisan  support  led  to  House  pdsrage  of  a  slightly  differ- 
ent  halanced  budget  amendment  (BBA)  on  January  26,  1995.  When  a 
Senate  BBA  fell  just  one  vote  short  of  the  required  two-thirds  majority  a 
few  weeks  later  (March  2),  Majority  Leader  Robert  Dole  (R-Kansas) 
changed  his  vote  kern  yes  to  no  in  a  parbamentary  move  that  allows  him 
to  bring  the  legislation  to  another  vote  before  the  federal  elections  of 
1996. 
This  Pt.&c  Policy  Btief  assesses  arguments  offered  in  support  of  the  BBA. 
While  there  is  no  question  that  current  budget  policies  warrant  reform, 
constitutional  change  is  not  the  solution:  a  BBA  would  lead  to  even 
greater  fiscal  irresponsibility.  Advocates  of  a  BBA  are  proposing  legisla- 
tion  that  would  be  toxic,  not  tonic,  to  our  economic  and  political 
systems. 
The  brief  is  divided  into  three  sections.  The  first  provides  a  brief  review 
of  budget  philosophies  and  past  efforts  to  enact  a  BBA,  recent  proposals, 
and  arguments  supporting  such  proposals.  The  second  offers  the  case 
against  the  halanced  budget  amendment.  The  third  identifies  some  more 
promising  budget  reform  alternatives. 
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Balanced Budget Amendment Proposals and Arguments 
The  Kimmel  Study 
In  a  1959  report  for  The  Brookings  Institution,  Lewis  Kimmel  traced  the 
evohition  of  federal  budget  and  fiscal  policy  from  the  beginning  of  the 
nation  to  1958.  His  study  found  that  the  idea  of  the  annually  balanced 
budget  was  accepted  by  most  Americans  until  the  1930s.  The  principal 
economic  reason  advanced  in  support  of  the  balanced  budget  was  that 
federal  borrowing  would  slow  economic  progress  by  crowding  out  private 
investment.  War  debt  was  rhe  only  widely  accepted  exception,  and  its 
rapid  elimination  in  peacetime  was  expected  (Kimmel  1959,  301-302). 
The  Kimmel  study  explains  that  the  balanced  budget  principle  was  con- 
sistent  with  an  ethical  view  of  indebtedness  as  evil  or  immoral  that  per- 
vaded  American  culture,  a  society  in  which  thrift  was  considered  an 
indispensable  individual  virtue.  According  to  the  study,  economists 
warned  that  unbalanced  budgets  produce  a  government  that  is  “extrava- 
gant  and  irresponsible”  (Kimmel  1959,302). 
During  the  193Os,  however,  views  about  balancing  the  federal  budget 
underwent  a  revolutionary  change  in  both  theory  and  practice.  This 
change  was  precipitated  by  the  collapse  of  America’s  economic  and  finan 
cial  system  in  the  winter  of  1933,  a  collapse  that  followed  over  half  a  cen- 
tury  of  increasing  economic  instability  and  recurrent  financial  crises.  The 
result  was  the  concept  of  “compensatory”  fiscal  policy,  an  approach  that 
not  only  emphasizes  the  impact  taxes  and  public  spending  can  have  on 
the  overall  economy,  but  aIso  argues  that  public  action  should  be  used  to 
secure  economic  stabilization  in  the  face  of  business  cycles.  In  short,  the 
notion  of  balancing  the  economy  replaced  that  of  balancing  the  budget 
(Kimmel  1959,7-8). 
Kimmel  notes  that  although  many  business  leaders  and  economists 
accepted  the  need  for  compensatory  policy  in  the  wake  of  the  Great 
Depression,  an  “influential  minority”  continued  to  have  serious  misgive 
ings  about  any  departure  from  a  balanced  peacetime  federal  budget,  and 
many  of  them  advocated  a  constitutional  amendment  that  would  outlaw 
such  deficits.  This  minority  found  federal  expenditures  “unconscionably 
high”;  they  feared  that  a  faihire  to  return  to  the  practice  of  an  annually 
16  Pubfic Policy Brie_/ The  Ekdanced  Budget  Amendment:  Toxic,  Not  Timic 
balanced  budget  would bankrupt  the  country,  destroy  the  enterprise  econ- 
omy,  and  extinguish  personal  liberties  (Kimmel  1959,298-299).1 
Proposals  During  the  1980s  and  Early  1990s 
The  Kimmel  study demonstrates  that  there  have  been  calls  for  a  balanced 
budget  constitutional  amendment  since  the  193Os,  but  interest  in  a  bal- 
anced  budget  requirement  intensified  with  the  renewed  economic  insta- 
bility  and  rising  federal  deficits  of  the  1970s  and  1980s  (see  Table  1). 
After  the  overall  federal  deficit  nearly  doubled  from  $40.2  billion  in  1979 
to  $79.0  billion  in  1981,  BBA  proponents  had  support  from  a  solid  major- 
ity  of  the  public  (67  percent  according  to  one  survey)  and  from  many  in 
Congress  (Blinder  and  Holtz-Eakin  1984).  In  re.sponse  to  that  apparent 
demand,  legislators  brought  the  amendment  to  a  vote  in  1982.  The  pro- 
posal  cleared  the  Senate  by  a  two-vote  margin,  but  fell  short  in  the  House 
with  a  vote  of  236  to  187.  Similar  bills  failed  to  pass  both  houses  again  in 
1986  and  1990.2 
Table  1  Federal  Surplus  or  Deficit  (-),  Selected  Fiscal  Years 
from  1960  to  1995 
Percentage of  Gross 
Fiscal  Year  Billions  of  Dollars  Domestic Product 
1960  0.3  0.1 
1965  -  1.4  -  0.2 
1970  -  2.8  -  0.3 
1975  -  53.2  -3.5 
1980  -  73.8  -  2.8 
1984  -  185.4  -  5.0 
1986  -  221.2  -  5.2 
1988  -  155.2  -3.2 
1990  -  221.4  -  4.0 
1992  -  290.4  -  4.9 
1993  -  255.1  -4.1 
1994  -  203.2  -3.1 
1995  -  192.5  -  2.7 
NW  1995 statistics are estimated  in  Eccmcmic Report offhe  PnGicnt  (1994). 
Source: Edget  of  dte United States Goaxmmmc, Fiscd Yea-r 1996 (1995). 
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Another  amendment  was  introduced  by  Senator  Paul  Simon  (D-Illinois) 
and  Representative  Charles  Stenholm  (D-Texas)  in  1992.  That  year, 
despite  the  1985  Gramm-Rudman-Hollings  Act,  which  was  designed  to 
reduce  the  deficit  to  zero  by  1991,  the  overall  federal  deficit  was  expected 
to  exceed  $300  billion.3  At  first,  momentum  behind  the  bill  seemed  over- 
whelming:  the  House  discharged  the  legislation  from  committee  in  record 
time;  most  Americans  were  reported  to  be  in  favor  of  the  amendment; 
public  outrage  over  political  gridlock  and  the  House  check-bouncing 
scandal  added  to  the  pressure  for  passage;  and  initial  vote  estimates  indi- 
cated  that  approval  appeared  inevitable  (Dewar  and  Gugliotta  1992, 
Al4).  But  by  early  June  lobbying  against  the  measure  was  proving  effec- 
tive,  and  prospects  for  the  amendment  grew  dim  (Clymer  1992).4  The 
1992  initiative  died  later  that  month  when  it  failed  to  pass  in  the  House. 
The  sponsors  of  the  1992  proposal  reintroduced  the  measure  in  1994. 
Indeed,  several  versions  were  debated  in  the  House,  and  two  major  alter- 
natives  were  considered  by  the  Senate.  On  March  1  Senate  BBA  support- 
ers  fell  4  votes  short  of  passing  the  Simon  amendment;  on  March  17  in 
the  House  the  Stenholm  bill  fell  short  of  the  required  two-thirds  majority 
by  12  votes. 
The  Contract  with  America  and  Beyond 
The  first  item  in  the  CWA  legislative  agenda,  the  Fiscal  Responsibility 
Act,  sought  an  amendment  to  the  U.S.  Constitution  requiring  that  “total 
outlays  for  any  fiscal  year  do  not  exceed  total  receipts  for  that  year” 
(House  Republican  Conference  1994b,  4).  The  resolution  (H.J.  Res.  1) 
defined  total  receipts  as  “all  receipts  of  the  United  Srates  except  those 
derived  from  borrowing”  and  total  outlays  as  “all  outlays  of  the  United 
States  except  those  for  the  repayment  of  debt  principal”  (House 
Republican  Conference  1994a,  3).  The  amendment  required  balance  at 
the  time  of  budget  submission  by  the  president,  adoption  by  Congress, 
and  subsequent  execution.5  The  amendment  outlined  only  three  circum- 
stances  under  which  deficits  would  be  allowed:  (I)  when  a  declaration  of 
war  is  in  effect,  (2)  when  a  joint  resolution  indicating  that  the  nation 
faces  an  “imminent  and  serious  military  threat  to  national  security”  is 
signed  by  the  president  and  adopted  by  a  majority  of  the  tota  member- 
ship  of  each  house,  and  (3)  when  outlays  in  excess  of  receipts  are  agreed 
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to  by  three-fifths  of  the  total  membership  in  each  house  of  Congress 
(House  Republican  Conference  1994~1). 
The  bill  stipulated  that  the  federal  debt  would  be  limited  to  its  level  on 
the  first  day  of  the  second  fiscal  year  after  ratification-a  limit  that  could 
be  increased  only  by  a  three-fifths  vote  in  each  house.  Legislation  to 
increase  receipt5  also  would  require  approval  by  a  three-fifths  majority  of 
the  membership  in  each  house.  (This  tax  limitation  provision  led  some  to 
call  the  CWA  proposal  a  “balanced  budget  and  tax  limitation  amend- 
ment.“)  The  amendment  mandated  roll-call  budget  votes.  And,  finally,  it 
indicated  that  the  balanced  budget  requirement  would  take  effect  in  fiscal 
year  (FY)  2002  or  the  second  fiscal  year  after  ratification,  whichever  was 
later. 
The  CWA  amendment  failed  to  secure  enough  votes  for  passage  on 
January  26,  1995.  But  later  that  evening  a  BBA  drafted  by  Charles 
Stenholm  and  Dan  Schaefer  (R-Colorado)  passed  on  a  vote  of  300  to 
132.  This  resolution  differed  from  the  CWA  proposal  in  two  major  ways; 
it  imposed  no  federal  debt  ceiling  and  contained  no  tax  limitation  provi- 
sion  (Stenholm  1995). 
On  March  2  an  amendment  that  was  nearly  identical  to  Stenholm+ 
Schaefer  was  narrowly  defeated  in  the  Senate.6  The  initial  vote  fell  just 
one  short  of  the  required  two-thirds  majority.  Robert  Dole  changed  his 
vote  from  yes  to  no  so  that  he  could,  by  parliamentq  rules,  bring  the  leg- 
islation  to  another  vote  before  the  next  congressional  election.  Dole 
stated  that  he  intends  to  have  Congress  give  the  BBA  renewed  attention 
and  consideration  during  the  upcoming  political  campaign  season. 
The  Case  for  the  Amendment 
The  CWA  states  that  a  BBA  is  needed  “to  restore  fscal  responsibility  to 
an  out-of-control  Congress,  requiring  them  to  live  under  the  same  budget 
constraints  as  families  and  businesses”  (Contract  with  America  1994).  A 
Republican  National  Committee  description  of  the  contract  insists  “It’s 
time  to  force  the  government  to  live  within  its  means  and  restore 
accountability  to  the  budget  in  Washington”  (Republican  National 
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Committee  1994).  The  House  Republican  Conference  I_.egi&tiwe Digest 
adds: 
Supporters  of  a  BBA  argue  that  Congress  has  shown  itself  both  unwill- 
ing  and  incapable  of  balancing  the  federal  budget.  A  constitutional 
amendment  is  necessary  to  force  lawmakers  to  do  what,  on  their  own, 
they  cannot:  get  a  handle  on  out-of-control  spending.  (House 
Republican  Inference  1994b,  1) 
The  argument  that  a  constitutional  requirement  is  necessary  to  ensure 
“fiscal  responsibility”  has  been  emphasized  by  many  during  recent  BBA 
battles.  In  1992,  for  example,  Senator  Simon  offered  the  same  assessment 
as  the  House  Republicans  and  added,  “Critics  wish  for  the  day  when  our 
leaders  will  come  to  grips  with  the  deficit  crisis  without  a  constitutional 
crutch.  But  danger  is  upon  us”  (Simon  1992).  According  to  Simon,  one 
“danger”  is  that  “virtually  every  major  area  of  policy  is  being  squeezed  or 
ignored  because  of  runaway  interest  payments.”  Another  is  that  the  bud- 
get  deficit  discourages  industrial  investment  (Simon  1992). 
Simon’s  concern  about  investment  is  probably  the  economic  point  raised 
most  often  in  discussions  of  the  need  for  budget  balance.  As  Federal 
Reserve  Chairman  Alan  Greenspan  noted  in  a  1989  article,  deficits  have 
a  “corrosive”  effect  on  the  economy  because  they  dampen  economic 
activity  by  triggering  the  following  series  of  events:  resources  are  pulled 
away  from  net  private  investment  (crowding  out),  the  rate  of  growth  of 
the  nation’s  capital  stock  is  reduced,  productivity  gains  are  less  than 
would  have  otherwise  been  the  case,  and  the  growth  of  our  standard  of 
living  is  similarly  impaired  (Greenspan  1989).  Many  BBA  supporters  also 
maintain  that  deficits  reduce  exports  (and  injure  export-dependent  work- 
ers  and  firms)  by  engendering  high  interest  rates  and  raising  the  value  of 
the  U.S.  dollar.  Simon,  for  example,  wrote  in  1992  that  the  trade  deficit 
would  be  cut  32  to  47  cents  for  every  dollar  reduction  of  the  budget 
deficit  (Simon  1992). 
In  theory,  one  solution  to  the  problem  of  budget  deficits  might  be  to  close 
the  gap  between  outlays  and  revenues  by  simply  raising  taxes.  However, 
there  are  three  main  arguments  offered  against  this  idea.  First,  raising 
taxes  is  highly  unpopular  because  most  Americans  feel  they  are  already 
taxed  too  heavily  and  they  have  little  confidence  in  the  public  sector 
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(Fergler  and  Mandle  1991).  Second,  legislators  are  concerned  about  the 
disincentive  effects  of  taxation  and  fear  that  higher  taxes  would  have  a 
negative  impact  on  work,  saving,  and  investment.  (Some  worry  this  disin 
centive  might  even  cause  certain  tax  hikes  to  yield  a  net  revenue  loss.) 
Third,  there  is  the  view  that  higher  raxes  will  simply  pave  the  way  for  fur- 
ther  spending  increases.  As  Milton  Friedman  wrote: 
Taxes have been  going up  for  50  years without any  apparent  success  in 
eliminating  deficits.  That  experience  suggests  Congress  will  spend 
whatever  the  tax  system  yields  plus  the  highest  deficit  the  public  will 
accept.  (Friedman  1988) 
Taking  the  “public  choice”  perspective  that  government  officials  aim  to 
serve  their  own  interests,  Friedman  argues  that  institutional  reform 
through  a  constitutional  amendment  is  required  to  link  the  self-interest 
of  legislators  to  budget  balancing.7  Today,  Friedman  maintains,  a  legislas 
tor  has  an  incentive  to  act  favorably  on  a  lobbyist’s  request  for  public 
funds  because  gains  are  concentrated  and  highly  visible,  while  costs  are 
small  and  widespread. A  BBA,  h owever,  would  alter  this  equation. 
If  a  constitutional amendment required total  spending  to  be  limited,  the 
legislator’s  self-interest  would  change.  He  could  now  tell  the  lobbyist, 
“You’re  right.  Your  project  is excellent.  However, the  Constitution  lim- 
its  the  total  amount we can  spend. I  can  only  vote  for  your  project  if  I 
vote  less for  something  else.  What  else  shall  I  vote  less  for?” That  would 
pit  one  special  interest  against  another  and  change  the  tules  of  the 
game  in  such  a  way that  the  legislator would  now  find  it  in  his  self- 
interest  to  operate  in  the  public  interest.  (Friedman  1986,6) 
The  public  choice  perspective  al.so suggests why  deficit  reduction  has  not 
been  achieved  through  reductions  in  pubhc  expenditures:  Congress  has 
found  it  impossible  to  make  substantial  cuts  because  losses  would  be 
resisted  vigorously  by  organized  interests.  Thus,  the  BBA  movement 
reflects  a  sense  of  desperation  that  legislators  feel  over  not  being  able  to 
control  deficits  through  political  discipline.  As  Senator  Pete  Domenici 
(R-New  Mexico)  said  in  1992,  “We  shouldn’t  have  to  do  this.  This  is  not 
the  way  to  run  the  government,  but  we  aren’t  running  the  government 
right  now.  .  .  .  It  seems  to  be  the  only  way”  (quoted  in  Dewar  and 
Gughotta  1992,  Al4). 
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Most  supporters  of  the  BBA  stress  both  crowding  out  and  the  need  for 
institutional  reform  to  address  the  incentive  problem.  Additional  argu- 
ments  put  forth  by  BBA  advocates  include  the  following. 
We  have  no  right  to  impose  a  debt  burden  of  more  than  $4  trillion-a 
debt  equal  to  more  than  $19,000  per  U.S.  citizen+n  future  genera- 
tions.  This  concern  is  often  raised  as  a  matter  of  generational  equity, 
constitutional  liberty,  and  morality  (Peterson  1993).  As  the  discussion 
of  the  nation’s  early  aversion  to  debt  suggests,  it  is  a  position  with  deep 
roots  in  American  history. 
Nearly  all  state  and  local  governments  in  the  nation  are  required  to  bal- 
ance  their  budgets  each  year  (Schmertz  1994,  51).  Forty-eight  states 
have  balanced  budget  requirements,  with  35  of  them  constitutional  and 
13  statutory  (Regan  1995,l). 
Recessions  can  be  managed  under  the  BBA.  According  to  Senators 
Simon  and  Domenici,  “Since  1962,  we  have  passed  11  stimulus  pack- 
ages  to  deal  with  recessions.  l&et-y  one  of  those  has  passed  by  more 
than  60  votes.  We  can  deal  with  this  [through  the  BBA  override  provi- 
sion]”  (Simon  1994,  Sl832;  Domenici  1994,  Sl830). 
A  BBA  is  needed  now  not  merely  because  there  have  been  federal  deficits 
since  FY  1969,  but  because  painful  choices  must  be  forced  “sooner 
rather  than  later”  (Simon  1992).  Although  the  deficit  has  fallen  since 
FY  1992,  legislators  warn  that  it  is  far  from  under  control.  “Just  give  it  a 
couple  of  years,”  says  Senator  Domenici,  referring  to  projections  of  ris- 
ing  deficits  in  the  years  ahead  due  to  rising  entitlement  costs  and  inter- 
est  payments  on  the  federal  debt  (Domenici  1994,  Sl831;  Feinstein 
1994,  Sl831).  Present  estimates  of  the  Office  of  Management  and 
Budget  (OMB)  and  Congressional  Budget  Office  (CBO)  indicate 
steady  deficit  increases  into  the  middle  of  the  next  decade,  and  when 
baby  boomers  begin  to  retire  in  large  numbers  in  2010,  the  fiscal  pic- 
ture  is  expected  to  “deteriorate  significantly”  (Wessel  and  Frisby  1994). 
The  BBA  imposes  a  requirement  that  Congress  “will  not  be  able  to  rou- 
tinely  waive  or  ignore”  (House  Republican  Conference  1994b,  1).  In 
particular,  legislators  would  be  obliged  to  meet  the  terms  of  the  amend- 
ment  because  they  are  sworn  to  uphold  the  Constitution. 
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The  Case  Against  the  Balanced  Budget  Amendment 
Many  Americans  are  frustrated  by  both  the  process  and  the  outcomes  of 
the  federal  budget.  After  watching  an  almost  endless  series  of  congres- 
sional  efforts  to  grapple  with  fiscal  imbalances  over  the  past  decade,  citi- 
zens  now  hear  that  despite  recent  deficit  reductions  the  f&re  will  bring 
only  more  and  more  red  ink.  But  while  a  desire  for  decisive  action  on  the 
deficit  issue  may  be  quite  understandable,  a  balanced  budget  amendment 
would  bring  only  fkther  injury to  our  political  and  economic  systems. 
Political  Dangers 
Our  discussion  of  political  dangers  must  begin  by  emphasizing  that  a  BBA 
is  onIy  a  statement  of  intention.  The  danger  here  is  that  passing  a  BBA 
might  lead  us  to  believe  our  fiscal  problems  are  solved.  If  so,  it  would 
divert  our  attention  from  the  need  to  make  difficult  choices  (Economic 
Report  ofthe  President  1994,39;  Peterson  1993,226-227). 
Advocates  of  the  BBA  argue  it  will  force  Congress  to  control  spending 
and  balance  the  federal  budget.  It  is  worth  noting  that  the  particular 
amendment  passed  recently  by  the  House  contains  little  that  could  con- 
trol  spending  (since  it  contains  neither  a  spending  limit  of  the  sort  men- 
tioned  by  Friedman  nor  a  tax  limitation  provision  such  as  the  one  in  the 
CWA).  But  the  more  important  point  is  that  no  BBA  can  force  these 
outcomes.8 
Even  longtime  BBA  advocate  Senator  Simon  acknowledges  that 
Americans  should  not  expect  “an  ironclad  guarantee”  of  fiscal  discipline 
under  a  constitutional  amendment  on  the  budget.  He  writes,  “The 
Constitution  is  no  place  for  airtight  procedural  details  that  can  withstand 
budgetary  tricks  a  future  Administration  or  Congress  might  dream  up” 
(Simon  1992).  Former  CBO  Director  Rudolph  Penner  takes  this  point  to 
its  logical  conclusion:  “If  there  is  little  political  will  to  realize  a  goal, 
putting  it  in  the  Constitution  will  not  help.  Thus,  a  constitutional 
amendment  requiring  a  balanced  budget  will  work  as  well  as  the 
Prohibition  amendment”  (Penner  1992)5’ 
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Penner  argues  that  the  futility  of  using  constitutions  to  balance  budgets  is 
clear  from  the  experience  of  state  governments.  He  notes  that  while  nearly 
all  states  have  constitutional  provisions  or  legislation  requiring  a  balanced 
budget,  many  have  circumvented  their  requirements  not  only  by  creating 
off-budget  agencies,  but  also  by  resorting  to  “outrageous”  accounting  gim- 
micks  (Penner  1992).  In  congressional  testimony  presented  during  the 
1994  BBA  debate,  S  Jay  Levy  and  Edward  V.  Regan  of  The  Jerome  Levy 
Eonomics  Institute  of  Bard  College  expressed  a  similar  view. 
Drawing  on  various  studies  of  state  finance  and  on  Mr.  Regan’s  experi- 
ence  as  chief  executive  of  an  urban  county  and  chief  fiscal  officer  of  New 
York  State,  testimony  by  Levy  and  Regan  identified  the  following  com- 
monly  used  budget-balancing  devices  and  practices. 
C&budget  uccounts.  States  borrow  from  pools  of  money  outside  the  gen- 
eral  fund  or  shift  the  fmancing  of  functions  to  off-budget  accounts.10 
Trming  of  receip  and  payment  activities.  States  accelerate  revenues  such  as 
tax  collections;  delay  expenditures  to  localities,  school  districts,  and 
suppliers;  and  delay  refunds  to  taxpayers  and  salary  payments  to 
employees. 
l’ension  fimk  Pension  contributions  are  reduced  by  forcing  changes  in 
actuarial  assumptions. 
Credit  markets.  States  borrow  repeat&Jly  against  the  same  assets  by  refi- 
nancing  them  even  after  most  of  the  original  debt  has  been  repaid. 
Asset  sales.  Buildings  and  roads,  for  example,  are  sold  or  transferred 
(sometimes  to  another  state  agency)  under  a  sale&aseback  scheme. 
Deferred  maintenunce.  Routine  infrastructure  repairs  are  avoided  until 
deteriorating  conditions  make  a  major  reconstruction  unavoidab1e.j  1 
Levy  and  Regan  conclude  that  the  “flaw  of  a  BBA  at  the  federal  level  is 
that  it  would  encourage  use  of  these  activities”  (Levy  and  Regan  1994, 
24).12 
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In  addition  to  state  experience,  Penner  points  to  congressional  behavior 
under  Gramm-Rudman  for  additional  evidence  that  a  BBA  would 
encourage  undesirable  fiscal  practices  (Penner  1992).  He  argues  that 
Gramm-Rudman  led  to  use  of  the  same  gimmicks  as  those  employed  by 
states.  He  adds  that  many  of  these  devices  are  expensive.  For  example, 
loan  prepayments  were  encouraged  by  the  federal  government  to  reduce 
near-term  deficits  despite  the  fact  that  such  action  was  costly  to 
Washington  in  terms  of  lost  interest  income. 
A  related  concern  was  expressed  by  Vie  New  Ymi< Times  in  a  1992  editori- 
al  (“Unbalanced”  1992).  It  noted  that  the  BBA  “invites  evasion-such  as 
loading  new  entitlements  onto  the  backs  of  state  governments  and 
employers.”  The  possibility  of  evasion  was  developed  further  by  Henry 
Aaron  of  The  Brookings  Institution  during  Senate  testimony  on  the  BBA 
in  1994  (Aaron  1994).  Aaron’s  conclusion  was  that  the  amendment 
would  be  a  historic  blunder  because  it  would  produce  “endless  and  subtle 
mischief.”  His  concern  is  that  the  amendment  would  not  make  elected 
officials  less  interested  in  promoting  their  favorite  projects.  Rather,  it 
would  simply  penalize  use  of  direct  expenditures  and  taxation.  Since 
Congress  already  has  much  experience  with  other  devices  that  can  be 
used  to  promote  their  objectives-devices  such  as  loan  guarantees,  state 
and  local  mandates,  and  regulations  on  the  private  sector-Aaron  is  con- 
cerned  that  the  BBA  would  encourage  their  further  use,  “even  when 
direct  spending  or  taxes  are  demonstrably  superior”  (Aaron  1994). 
The  threat  of  federal  cost-shifting  to  states  and  localities  is  taken  so  seri- 
ously  outside  Washington  that  members  of  Congress  have  recently  tried 
to  ease  this  concern  by  developing  legislation  that  would  make  imposing 
unfunded  mandates  on  nonfederal  government  entities  more  difficult. 
But  not  even  a  total  ban  on  federal  mandates  can  insulate  these  entities. 
New  burdens  could  come  in  various  forms,  including  curs  in  grants-in-aid, 
elimination  of  the  tax-exempt  status  of  state  and  municipal  bonds, 
increased  competition  for  consumption-ba.sed  revenue,  and  termination 
of  federal  programs  (Snell  and  Mackey  1994,11-13). 
All  these  financial  practices,  accounting  evasions,  and  cost-shifting 
efforts  are  in  themselves  political  dangers  presented  by  a  BBA.  But  an- 
other  danger  stems  from  the  amendment’s  encouragement  of  this  entire 
range  of  activities.  The  danger  is  that  the  development  and  defense  of 
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these  activities  would  divert  congressional  attention  from  more  meaning- 
ful  efforts  to  resolve  the  real  and  growing  budget  challenges  facing  our 
nation.  (These  challenges  include  the  need  for  a  consensus  on  current  fis- 
cal  policy  objectives  and  priorities  and  the  need  for  action  to  address 
t%ure  difficukies  in  the  realms  of  health  care  and  retirement  benefits.13) 
Moreover,  since  legislators  would  not  find  addressing  these  matters  any 
easier  under  a  BBA,  it  is  likely  that  the  amendment  would  engender  an 
even  further  erosion  of  public  confidence  in  our  government,  especially 
if,  as  Aaron  expects,  partisan  disputes  trigger  a  never-ending  series  of 
debates  on  the  appropriateness  of  particular  evasions.  Still  another  con- 
cern  is  that  such  debates  would  not  only  further  harm  the  reputation  of 
Congress,  but  also  demean  our  nation’s  Constitution  (Aaron  1994; 
Penner  1992). 
The  encouraging  of  financial  gimmicks,  distraction  from  real  and  growing 
challenges,  and  erosion  of  the  reputation  of  Congress  and  the 
Constitution  are  among  the  most  significant  of  the  political  dangers  aris- 
ing  from  a  BBA.  But  the  amendment  raises  other  political  problems  as 
well;  six  of  them  are  identified  here. 
1.  Several  observers  have  expressed  concern  that  a  60  percent  congres- 
sional  supermajority  to  waive  the  balanced  budget  requirement  “threatens 
to  reinstall  both  gridlock  and  the  tyranny  of  the  minority”  (Economic 
Report  of  t$e  Presidenr  1994,39).  Penner,  for  example,  notes  it  might  be  dif- 
ficult  to  break  an  impasse  if  a  simple  majority  cannot  be  found  to  enact  a 
balanced  budget  and  a  supermajority  cannot  be  found  to  approve  a  deficit 
(Penner  1992).  Aaron  adds  that  the  BBA  would  “increase  the  power  of  a 
determined  minority  not  just  to  restrict  the  scope  of  government  but  also 
to  expand  their  favorite  programs”  (Aaron  1994).  In  a  recession,  he 
explains,  “A  determined  40  percent  of  e&&r  house  could  force  the  majori- 
ty  to  support  any  particular  tax  or  spending  change  (increase  or  decrease) 
as  a  condition  for  supporting  the  waiver  of  the  balanced  budget  require- 
ments,”  and  placing  such  power  in  the  hands  of  determined  minorities,  he 
concludes,  “is  surely  bad  policy”  (Aaron  1994,2). 
2.  Although  a  vote  in  favor  of  the  BBA  may  provide  today’s  legislators 
with  a  short-term  pohtical  gain,  ir  is  a  requirement  not  imposed  upon 
themselves  but  on  members  of  Congress  in  FY  2002  and  beyond.  A  con- 
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vincing  case  can  be  made,  of  course,  for  allowing  both  ratification  time 
and  a  slow  adjustment  to  budget  balance.  But  some  have  nevertheless 
suggested  that  an  element  of  hypocrisy  still  exists.  As  thenCongressman 
(now  White  House  Chief  of  Staff)  Leon  Panetta  stated  during  a  congres- 
sional  hearing  in  1992,  “There’s  a  lot  of  hypocrisy  around  here.  There  are 
a  lot  of  members  who  will  never  vote  tough  choices,  but  they’ll  vote  for  a 
BBA  because  they  know  they  will  never  have  to  make  a  balanced  budget” 
(quoted  in  Dewar  and  Gugliotta  1992,  Al4).  Panetta’s  view  do-es  indeed 
seem  to  have  merit  when  one  considers  that  Representative  Gerald 
Solomon  (R-New  York)  received  merely  73  House  votes  in  March  1994 
for  the  only  existing  program  with  a  line+by-hne  accounting  of  how  to 
achieve  a  balanced  budget  by  the  beginning  of  the  next  decade 
(Rosenbaum  1994). 
3.  A  question  of  responsible  governance  is  raised  when  the  budget 
amendment  is  considered  in  the  context  of  the  entire  CWA.  The  CWA 
calls  for  tax  cuts  that  the  CBO  and  House  Republicans  estimate  will  pro- 
duce  a  loss  of  $148  billion  in  revenues  over  five  years.  The  Republicans 
also  call  for  increased  defense  spending  and  a  protection  of  Social 
Security  benefits.  This  led  the  Concord  Coalition,  chaired  by  former 
Senators  Warren  Rudman  and  Paul  Tmngas,  to  the  following  conclusion 
on  both  the  CWA  and  a  similar  “Agenda  for  the  Republican  Majority” 
issued  by  Senate  Republicans:  “Clearly  deficit  reduction  is  not  a  priority 
in  these  plans.  These  documents  are  about  getting  votes,  not  about  bal- 
ancing  the  budget”  (Concord  Coalition  1994?  1). 
In  response  to  concerns  regarding  revenue  losses  in  a  plan  that  calls  for 
deficit  elimination,  some  Republicans  have  been  emphasizing  the  need 
for  a  “dynamic  scoring”  of  the  revenue  impact  of  tax  changes.  ‘While  this 
scoring  may  be  sensible  in  theory,  it  is  already  leading  to  abuses  in  prac- 
tice.14  For  example,  forecasts  by  the  National  Center  for  Policy 
Analysiewhich  Inwstor’s  Business  Daily  calls  a  “supply-side  think  tank” 
whose  economists  “have  close  ties”  to  Representative  Richard  Armey 
(R-Texas&claim  the  CWA’s  tax  cuts  will  stimulate  economic  growth 
and  r&se  $623  billion  in  federal  revenues  over  five  years  (“Perspective” 
1994).  As  Paul  Craig  Roberts,  a  major  figure  in  the  1980s  supply-side  rev- 
olution  reminds  us,  “none”  of  that  decade’s  supply-side  measures  “ever 
claimed  that  tax  cuts  would  pay  for  themselves.”  The  Reagan  administm 
tion  in  particular  “did  not  predict  that  the  tax  cuts  would  be  self- 
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financing.  It  predicted  the  exact  opposite-that  every  dollar  of  tax  cut 
would  lose  a  dollar  of  revenue”  (Roberts  1991,  25-27).15  Claims  of  rev- 
enue  gains  due  to  greater  economic  growth  are  even  more  fantastic  when 
considered  in  light  of  the  Federal  Reserve’s  current  view  that  the  econo- 
my  is  already  at  its  growth  limit  and  needs  to  be  restrained  to  prevent 
inflation. 
4.  Critics  of  the  BBA  have  raised  an  important  political  question  about 
its  enforcement.  As  Senator  I-larry  Reid  (D-Nevada)  indicated  during 
the  1994  BBA  debate,  legal  scholars  are  concerned  that  once  the  amend- 
ment  takes  effect,  any  congressional  failure  to  produce  balanced  budgets 
would  lead  to  judicial  involvement  in  fiscal  policy,  since  the  federal 
courts  are  responsible  for  interpreting  and  overseeing  enforcement  of  the 
Constitution  (Reid  1994).  Court  involvement  is  unattractive  for  many 
reasons,  including  the  following:  the  courts  operate  in  a  manner  that  is 
too  slow  to  allow  timely  action  on  disputes  over  budgets  and  fiscal  policy; 
judges  have  no  special  expertise  in  budget  matters;  and  the  Constitution’s 
framers  sought  to  exclude  the  judiciary  from  fiscal  decisions.16  To  avoid 
this  unattractive  outcome,  legislators  have  sometimes  tried  to  write  a 
BBA  that  preempts  court  action.  But  then  the  problem  becomes  that 
such  an  amendment  is  entirely  symbolic.  An  amendment  left  to  Congress 
to  enforce  has  no  teeth  and  cannot  he  expected  to  affect  either  the  incen- 
tives  or  the  actions  of  federal  legislators. 
5.  Yet  another  argument  against  the  BBA  is  that  it  flows  fmm  a  question- 
able  premise  regarding  recent  federal  deficits.  The  public  choice  perspec- 
tive  suggests  that  such  deficits  are  a  result  of  legislators’  efforts  to  pursue 
their  own  individual  interests  at  the  expense  of  the  public  interest.  But 
empirical  work  by  Robert  Baldwin,  an  economist  who  is  sympathetic  to 
public  choice  theory,  indicates  that  self-interest  is  not  enough  to  explain 
public  policy  decisions.  In  particular,  Baldwin’s  research  finds  that  legisla- 
tors  are  often  motivated  not  only  by  self-interest,  but  also  by  a  concern 
for  social  well-being  that  can  be  inconsistent  with  the  public  choice 
model  (Baldwin  1985,  165). 
Although  citizens  often  respond  in  the  affirmative  when  pollsters  ask  sim- 
ply  if  deficits  should  be  reduced,  Stein  stresses  that  an  attempt  to  achieve 
deficit  reduction  requires  legislators  to  confront  an  array  of  social  benefits 
und  costs  (Stein  1994).  Thus,  it  is  not  at  all  clear  that  the  deficits  of  the 
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past  decade  have  been  incompatible  with  public  desires.  This  view  is  sup- 
ported  by  a  recent  poll  that  found  few  Americans  willing  to  support  a 
BBA  if  it  required  cuts  in  Social  Security,  Medicare,  or  education  expen- 
ditures  (Dowd  1994,  A24). 
6.  Finally,  many  analysts  have  asserted  that  the  1994  congressional  elcc- 
tion  represents  such  a  fundamental  change  in  political  direction  that  a 
BBA  is  unnecessary.  Their  argument,  which  has  not  yet  been  tested,  is 
that  the  1994  election  signaled  the  end  of  political  rewards  for  “bringing 
home  the  pork.”  As  Regan  explained  at  a  recent  Levy  Institute  workshop, 
citizens  seem  to  have  decided  both  that  if  the  pork  is  being  brought  home 
to  them,  it  is  being  brought  home  to  others,  too,  and  that  it  is  time  to  put 
an  end  to  the  feeding  for  all.  This  view  runs  contrary  to  the  public  choice 
perspective  that  institutional  change  is  necessary  because  it  suggests  that 
current  political  incentives  make  showing  fiscal  restraint  to  be  in  the  self- 
interest  of  politicians  (Regan  1994a). 
JZconomic  Dangers 
Turning  to  a  discussion  of  economic  problems  with  the  BBA,  one  must 
first  correct  the  CWA  suggestion  that  an  annually  balanced  budget  would 
put  Congress  “under  the  same  budget  constraints  as  families  and  busi- 
nesses”  (CWA  1994).  Corporations  and  households  do  not  generally 
achieve  or  even  strive  for  an  overall  budget  balance  each  year.  If  families 
lived  under  the  constraints  proposed  by  the  BBA,  then  they  would  need 
to  pay  cash  for  automobiles,  houses,  and  college  education.  If  businesses 
lived  under  this  constraint,  then  they  could  not  resort  to  borrowing  when 
investing  in  equipment  or  constructing  new  f%cilities.  The  almost  univer- 
sal  private  sector  practice  of  capital  budgeting  (taught  in  all  corporate 
fiance  and  accounting  courses)  would  also  come  to  an  end. 
In  fact,  few  state,  local,  and  even  national  governments  could  live  under 
this  budget  rule.  Unlike  federal  BBA  propasals,  state  requirements  seldom 
refer  explicitly  to  a  year-end  budget  balance.  Moreover,  public  capital 
budgets  are  quite  common  both  in  this  country  and  abroad.  For  example, 
42  states  have  separate  capital  budgets  that  are  not  required  to  be  bal- 
anced  (General  Accounting  mce  1993,1+  Levy  and  Regan  1994,2).17 Assessing he  Cmtimtid  Rome ra Fedmd  Budget Balance 
Capital  budgeting  at  the  level  of  the  states  is  rooted  in  a  long  history  of 
attempts  to  invest  in  canals,  roads,  and  other  “internal  improvements.” 
Capital  budgets  were  adopted  in  many  American  cities  during  the  1940s 
as  a  way  to  bring  a  more  rational  and  systematic  approach  to  municipal 
budgeting.  Today  capital  budgeting  can  be  found  in  approximately  90 
percent  of  the  cities  in  the  United  States  (Doss  1987;  Bozeman  1984). 
Most  discussions  of  public  capital  budgets  focus  on  the  distinction 
between  annual  expenditures  that  cover  government  operating  expenses 
and  outlays  that  involve  public  investments.18  But  there  are  at  least  three 
other  central  aspects  of  capital  budgeting:  identification  of  needed  or 
desired  public  improvement  projects,  development  of  a  multiyear  capital 
improvements  plan,  and  selection  of  a  financing  mechanism.  Most  state 
and  local  governments  finance  at  least  a  portion  of  their  capital  expendi- 
tures  through  borrowing.  The  rationale  here  is  that  public  capital  forma- 
tion  should  be  financed  like  corporate  and  household  assets  that  last  for  a 
number  of  years;  borrowing  allows  the  purchaser  of  an  asset  to  spread  the 
cost  over  the  asset’s  lifetime  (Bozeman  1984;  Hush  and  Peroff  1988;  and 
Heilbroner  1988). 
Advocates  of  a  BBA  are  correct  when  they  suggest  the  federal  govem- 
ment  should  adopt  budgeting  practices  that  more  closely  resemble  those 
used  by  other  economic  actors.  Washington  can  learn  much  from  an 
examination  of  budgeting  by  other  actors  in  both  the  public  and  the  pri- 
vate  sectors.  And,  one  important  lesson  that  might  be  derived  from  such 
an  examination  is  that  the  imposition  of  a  comprehensive,  annual 
budget-balancing  rule  does  not  represent  the  most  rational  budgeting 
approach  available  to  policymakers. 
There  is,  however,  an  important  area  in  which  the  experience  of  most 
other  economic  actors  is  not  relevant  to  federal  budgeting.  The  federal 
government  has  a  unique  responsibility:  it  alone  is  responsible  for  macro- 
economic  stabilization.  One  reason  the  United  States  has  avoided  a 
depression  since  the  1930s  is  that  federal  expenditures  and  revenues  have 
been  used  to  help  offset  private  sector  slumps.  A  balanced  budget  would 
eliminate  one  of  the  few  mechanisms  preventing  mild  downturns  from 
developing  into  severe  economic  crises.  In  other  words,  even  if  federal 
legislators  could  avoid  all  the  political  dangers  identified  earlier,  their 
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prize  for  adhering  to  a  balanced  budget  each  year  would  merely  be 
achievement  of  the  wrong  economic  goal.19 
Moreover,  maintaining  an  annually  balanced  budget  would  require  tax 
increases  and  spending  cuts  or  both  in  a  recession-actions  that  would 
exacerbate,  rather  than  compensate  for,  the  cyclical  downturn.  This  is 
not  fiscal  responsibility;  it  is  fiscal  irresponsibility.  As  Aaron  has  written: 
One  does  not  need  to  be  a  primitive  Keynesian  to  believe  that  a 
requirement  forcing  tax  increases  or  spending  cuts  during  economic 
slowdown could  be  catastrophic.  .  .  .  I  can  thir&  of  few policies  better 
calculated  to  turn  economic  shocks  into  major  calamities  than  a  bal- 
anced  budget requirement. (Aaron  1994,7) 
There  are  also  problems  with  Simon’s  suggestion  that  the  balanced  bud- 
get  requirement  will  be  easy  to  waive  in  times  of  recession.  The  vote  mar- 
gin  by  which  previous  stimulus  packages  have  been  passed  does  not 
ensure  that  legislators  will  be  able  to  respond  quickly  and  effectively  to 
every  fluctuation  in  our  economy,  especially  since  there  are  many  types  of 
lags  that  slow  the  policy  process.  Moreover,  the  waiver  suggestion  ignores 
the  fact  that  stimulus  packages  are  not  aIways  needed  today  because  vari- 
ous  automatic  stabihzers  (such  as  the  availability  of  unemployment  bene- 
fits  for  laid-off  workers)  are  an  inherent  part  of  our  present  tax  and 
expenditure  system.  The  BBA  would  require  a  Congress  fearful  of  unan- 
ticipated  deficits  to  consider  disabling  these  valuable  mechanisms. 
In  short,  the  BBA  ignores  the  reality  of  modem  fiscal  constraints  and 
points  us  in  the  wrong  direction:  back  to  a  less  stable  era  of  budget  bal- 
ante,  not  economic  balance.  In  this  manner,  it  is  toxic,  not  tonic,  to  our 
economic  well-being.  Still  other  economic  implications  of  the  BBA  are  as 
follows. 
1.  The  economic  impact  of  a  particular  federal  budget  deficit  depends  on 
more  than  its  magnitude  (measured  either  in  absolute  terms  or  as  a  frac- 
tion  of  national  output);  it  depends  in  part  on  the  state  of  the  economy. 
Implicit  in  the  concept  of  crowding  out  is  a  notion  of  a  full-employment 
economy.  But  since  the  real-world  economy  is  not  always  at  full  employ- 
ment,  deficits  of  the  size  required  to  compensate  for  private  sector  slack- 
nm  do  not  threaten  to  displace  business  investment.20  As  Simon’s  dis- 
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cussion  of  the  balanced  budget  waiver  indicates,  this  is  a  point  that  even 
some  BBA  adherents  recognize. 
2.  The  impact  of  a  federal  deficit  also  depends  partly  on  the  nature  of 
public  expenditures.  As  Stein  noted  in  his  1994  BBA  testimony,  we  do 
not  have  to  apologize  for  our  debt  legacy  if,  instead  of  financing  current 
consumption,  borrowing  is  for  investments  that  leave  a  safer  world  and  a 
more  prosperous  economy  for  our  children  and  grandchildren  (Stein 
1994).  Supporting  this  position  is  recent  empirical  research  that  shows 
that  public  infrastructure  spending  has  a  positive  effect  on  private  equip- 
ment  investment,  productivity,  and  real  wages  (for  example,  see  Erenburg 
1994). 
3.  In  James  D.  Savage’s  award-winning  Bukznced  Budge&  and  Ametin 
P&cs,  he  analyzes  the  economic  impact  of  deficit  spending  in  the 
United  States  between  1965  and  1984.  Savage  concludes  that  unbal- 
anced  federal  budgets  “have  not  created  the  ham&l  effects  often  attrib- 
uted  to  them  in  recent  years.  . .  .  Instead,  the  federal  government’s  deficits 
most  probably  helped  rather  than  hurt  the  economy  during  the  1981-83 
recession  and  played  an  important  role  in  assisting  the  1983-84  recovery” 
(Savage  1988,  54).  More  recently,  work  by  Robert  Eisner  on  the  U.S. 
economy  since  the  early  1960s  shows  that  higher  deficits  have  been  asso- 
ciated  with  more  rapid  growth  in  real  product,  higher  private  investment 
and  national  saving,  and  lower  unemployment  (Eisner  1994,89-119). 
4.  The  argument  in  the  case  for  the  BBA  that  deficits  hurt  our  trade 
position  is  not  supported  by  empirical  evidence.  Since  1992,  in  fact,  our 
trade  balance  has  worsened  while  the  federal  budget  deficit  has  fallen. 
(For  a  good  discussion  thar  disentangIes  these  “twin  deficits,”  see  Blecker 
1992.)  One  implication  is  that  trade  concerns  should  not  deter  federal 
officials  from  fulfilling  their  countercyclical  responsibilities. 
5.  An  economic  aspect  of  the  BBA  almost  entirely  ignored  in  current 
discussions  is  its  impact  on  the  nation’s  financial  system.  Government 
debt  has  played  a  fundamental  role  in  U.S.  monetary  policy  since  the 
1930s.  In  particular,  open-market  operations  of  the  Federal  Reserve 
require  a  large,  publicly  held  federal  debt.  Much  of  the  banking  system  of 
the  United  States  would  need  to  be  restructured  under  a  BBA.  Similarly, 
public  trust  funds  that  now  hold  only  government  debt  (such  as  the 
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Social  Security  fund)  would  need  to  find  a  new  investment  outlet.  As 
Hyman  I’.  Minsky  notes,  BBA  enactment  would  eventually  leave  the 
U.S.  economy  without  enough  government  debt  for  risk-averse  institu- 
tions  and  individuals  (Minsky  1995).21 
Review 
The  BBA  is  only  a  statement  of  intention.  Its  passage  does  not  substitute 
for  the  need  to  make  difficult  choices,  Moreover,  Gramm-Rudman  and 
the  experience  of  the  states  show  the  futility  of  adopting  budget  state- 
ments  when  there  is  no  political  will  to  carry  them  out.  Even  placing  this 
statement  in  the  Constitution  offers  no  special  advantage:  amending  that 
document  offers  no  airtight  protection  against  evasion,  for  all  fiscal  strait- 
jackets  can  be  stretched.  If  legislators  want  a  balanced  budget,  we  will  get 
one  even  without  a  BBA.  If  they  don’t,  the  BBA  can  only  taint  the 
Constitution,  lead  to  more  citizen  frustration,  and  engender  a  further  loss 
of  confidence  in  political  institutions. 
From  an  economic  perspective,  the  BBA  is  a  misguided  statement  of 
intention.  It  ignores  the  reality  of  private  sector  budgeting,  precludes  the 
development  of  federal  capital-budgeting  procedures,  and  hinders  the 
public  sector’s  ability  to  compensate  for  cyclical  fluctuations  in  the  econ- 
omy.22  The  amendment  also  has  important  financial  system  implications, 
implications  that  have  been  ignored  in  most  BBA  discussions. 
Budget  Reform  Alternatives 
If  the  BBA  will  bring  only  further  injury  to  the  U.S.  political  and  eco- 
nomic  systems,  then  how  should  the  federal  budget  system  be  reformed? 
To  begin,  we  must  be  clear  on  the  problems  we  seek  to  resolve.  First,  and 
perhaps  the  primary  problem,  fiscal  policy  appears  unconstrained  and 
directionless.  Second,  Americans  feel  the  public  sector  is  inefficient  and 
that  too  few  of  today’s  federal  expenditures  represent  an  investment  in 
our  future  well-being.  Third,  the  budget  process  seems  never-ending; 
many  have  described  it  as  “continuous”  budgeting-a  system  in  which 
“decisions  are  so  frequent  they  are  never  final”  (Rivlin  1986).  Fourth,  the 
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projected  growth  of  entitlements?  such  as  Medicare  and  Social  Security, 
threatens  to  overwhelm  all  other  future  fiscal  concerns.  Most  of  the 
discussion  that  follows  will  focus,  like  the  BBA,  on  the  first  of  these 
problems. 
Addressing  the  Lack  of  Direction  and  Restraint 
Much  support  for  the  BBA  seems  to  emanate  from  a  belief  that  U.S.  fiscal 
policy  is  directionless.  But  the  amendment  is  both  wrong  in  principle  and 
destructive  in  practice.  A  more  sensible  alternative  would  be  to  seek  a 
balance  in  the  high-employment  (or  structural)  budget-in  other  words, 
to  pursue  a  policy  of  f%lLemployment  budgeting. 
Full-employment  budgeting  yields  a  zero  deficit  or  some  predetermined 
surplus  if  the  economy  is  at  a  high  level  of  employment.  This  approach 
generates  a  deficit  to  compensate  for  a  cyclical  shortfall  of  private  spend- 
ing.  It  produces  an  increasing  surplus  as  unemployment  falls  beyond  some 
predetermined  level  associated  with  a  cyclical  recovery  (Economic  RePo?% 
c$  t.Ile  PW.s&3It  1994,26). 
One  does  not  need  to  follow  a  policy  that  balances  the  high-employment 
budget  to  calculate  a  cyclically  adjusted  estimate  of  the  magnitude  of  the 
deficit  for  any  given  year.  These  estimates  allow  legislators  and  the  public 
to  distinguish  deficits  caused  by  cyclical  fluctuations  from  deficits  caused 
by  more  structural  imbalances  in  receipts  and  expenditures  (see  Table  2). 
But  a  policy  that  seeks  to  eliminate  structural  deficits  would 
be  not  only  more  economically  sound,  but  also  easier  to  realize  than  a 
policy  that  strives  for  an  annually  balanced  budget.  Another  strength  of 
full-employment  budgeting  is  that  while  offering  a  budget  rule  that  every- 
one  can  understand,  it  continues  to  emphasize  the  federal  government’s 
countercyclical  responsibilities.23 
The  suggestion  that  federal  officials  should  focus  on  the  high-employment 
budget  is  not  new.  It  was  mentioned  during  a  BBA  hearing  before  the 
House  Judiciary  Committee  in  1988,  for  example,  by  Edmund  B. 
~ 
Fitzgerald,  Northern  Telecom’s  chairman  and  CEO.  Fitzgerald’s  remarks 
were  offered  while  he  was  chairman  of  the  corporate-sponsored 
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Table  2  Structural  Budget  Surplus  or  Deficit  (-), 
1959  to  1998  (overall  structural  budget  averages, 
inflation-adjusted) 
Percentage  of  Gross 
Fiscal  Years  Domestic  Product 
1959-1982  0.1 
1983-1993  -  1.9 
1994-1998  (forecat)  -  0.8 
Source: Economic  Report  of the Pres&u  (1994), 
Committee  for  Economic  Development  and  his  testimony  was  presented 
on  behalf  of  the  trustees  of  that  organization  (Fitzgerald  1988). 
But  what  is  the  appropriate  unemployment  target  for  full-employment 
budgeting?  When  the  question  was  asked  in  the  mid-197Os,  research  by 
the  U.S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  estimated  frictional  unemployment  at 
between  2.4  and  3.8  percent.  This  led  Senator  Hubert  Humphrey  to 
advocate  a  goal  of  4.0  percent  for  the  overall  labor  force,  a  goal  enacted 
into  law  by  the  Full  Employment  and  Balanced  Growth  Act  of  1978 
(FEBGA)  (Humphrey  19761.24 
Many  economists  believe  in  a  higher  “natural”  rate  of  unemployment,  a 
rate  beyond  which  further  increases  in  aggregate  demand  will  be  fully 
translated  into  inflation.  Indeed,  this  type  of  rate  is  currently  embedded 
in  snucturally  adjusted  deficit  figures  calculated  by  the  federal  govern- 
ment  (such  as  those  in  Table  2).  But  a  growing  body  of  theoretical  and 
empirical  evidence  challenges  this  notion  (see,  for  example,  Wolfson 
1993  and  Eisner  1994).  Moreover,  adherents  acknowledge  that  the  nat- 
ural  rate  can  be  shifted  by  institutional  changes  and  structural  economic 
developments,  and  the  predominant  econimic  trends  since  the  early 
1980s  are  ones  that  would  cause  this  rate  to  fall  (Rissman  1988).  In  fact, 
Robert  Gordon  and  other  prominent  defenders  have  recently  conceded 
their  inflation  estimates  were  overly  pessimistic  and  have  lowered  their 
estimates,  from  a  “nonaccelerating  inflation  rate  of  unemployment” 
(NAIRU)  of  6.0  percent  or  more  to  a  figure  closer  to  5.0  percent 
(Bennett  1995). 
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In  short,  one  alternative  to  the  BBA  is  full-employment  budgeting,  an 
approach  that  could  use  as  its  target  the  unemployment  rate  found  in 
either  PEBGA  or  NAIRU.  This  approach  to  budgeting,  under  either 
unemployment  target,  provides  fiscal  policy  with  more  direction  than  it 
has  today,  and  at  the  same  time  it  avoids  the  economic  and  political  dan- 
gers  of  a  BBA. 
Another  alternative  to  the  BBA  is  enactment  of  a  detailed,  multiyear 
deficit-reduction  plan  such  as  the  one  proposed  by  Representative 
Solomon  in  1994.  A  similar  proposal  has  been  offered  by  the  Concord 
Coalition.  The  alternative  represented  by  these  proposals  promises  more 
serious  deficit  reduction  than  a  BBA  because  it  involves  real  spending 
cuts  and  tax  increases.  Instead  of  offering  a  mere  statement  of  intention, 
these  proposals  make  the  hard  choices  that  are  needed  to  bring  the  fed- 
eral  budget  into  balance.  Moreover,  the  absence  of  a  constitutional 
amendment  allows  flexibility  in  the  event  of  unanticipated  economic 
developments.25 
The  full-employment  budgeting  alternative  offers  a  sensible  long-term 
goal.  The  detailed  deficit-reduction  alternative  makes  hard  choices  today. 
In  contrast,  BBA  enactment  provides  neither. 
Addressing  Other  Problems 
Today  both  major  political  parties  in  the  United  States  are  attempting  to 
streamline  federal  structures,  procedures,  and  policies  in  response  to  citi- 
zen  demands  for  a  more  efficient  public  sector.  In  addition,  President 
Clinton  and  others  emphasize  the  need  to  make  government  work  better 
by  bringing  a  greater  investment  orientation  to  federal  expenditures 
through  an  emphasis  on  human  resources,  infrastructure,  and  technology. 
The  bipartisan  Competitiveness  Policy  Council,  for  example,  finds  merit 
in  this  perspective.  It  suggests  that  Congress  and  the  White  House  adopt 
an  “investment  budget”  (Competitiveness  Policy  Council  1993,8). 
The  council  wants  each  budget  submitted  to  Congress  to  distinguish 
between  federal  investment  expenditures  and  federal  consumption 
expenditures.  It  also  recommends  that  Congress  vote  on  the  adequacy 
of  the  investment  component.  The  council  defines  this  component 
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broadly.  Items  in  the  investment  budget  would  include  public  outlays  for 
education,  infrastructure,  research  and  development  assistance,  and  work- 
er  training  (Competitiveness  Policy  Council  1993,8). 
The  council  notes  that  federal  spending  in  these  areas  has  fallen  sharply 
since  the  late  1960s.  It  argues  that  an  investment  budget  would  draw 
attention  to  this  decline  and  help  mitigate  the  current  tendency  to  avoid 
programs  with  a  delayed  payoff.  Fiscal  discipline  would  bc  retained  under 
this  arrangement  because  the  proposal  calls  for  public  investment  and 
consumption  expenditures  to  be  considered  together  in  deficit  calcula- 
tions  (Competitiveness  Policy  Council  1994,30-3  1;  1993,8).26 
Another  approach  to  the  problem  of  public  investment  is  capital  budget- 
ing.  While  federal  capital-budgeting  proposals  have  been  offered  for 
decades,  Pat  Choate  and  Susan  Walter  revived  interest  in  this  approach  in 
the  early  1980s  by  chronicling  the  decline  in  public  infrastructure  invest- 
ment  (Choate  and  Walter  1983).  Recent  works  suggesting  the  beneficial 
economic  impact  of  such  investments  (such  as  Erenburg  1994)  have 
brought  additional  attention  to  capital  budgeting  in  the  past  few years. 
In  testimony  submitted  to  the  Senate  Judiciary  Committee  earlier  this 
year,  David  A.  Levy,  vice  chairman  and  director  of  forecasting  at  The 
Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute  of  Bard  College,  outlined  a  capital- 
budgeting  proposal  that  warrants  consideration  by  federal  policymakers. 
His  proposal  follows  the  traditional  capital-budgeting  approach  in  that  it 
counts  only  spending  on  long-lived,  physical  asset.  as  capital  investments. 
But  it  also  calls  for  establishment  of  an  independent  body  of  accounting 
experts  responsible  for  developing  (and  overseeing  use  of)  strict  account- 
ing  principles  to  be  employed  in  the  course  of  such  budgeting  (David 
Levy  1995).  This  body  could  not  only  be  modeled  after  but  also  build  on 
the  work  of  the  existing  Governmental  Accounting  Standards  Board 
(GASB)  that  now  performs  similar  functions  for  states  and  municipalis 
ties.  Among  matters  to  be  decided  by  such  a  board  are  issues  involving 
the  allocation  of  costs  among  operating  and  capital  accounts  and  the 
determination  of  proper  depreciation  schedules  (David  Levy  1995). 
According  to  the  General  Accounting  Office,  the  Federal  Accounting 
Standards  Advisory  Board  has  already  made  initial  explomtions  into 
appropriate  depreciation  concepts  (Posner  1993,14-15). 
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A  reform  that  addresses  the  problem  of  the  never-ending  budget  process 
is  a  two-year  budget  and  appropriations  cycle.  A  BBA  still  requires  the 
budget  to  be  revisited  each  year.  A  biennial  budget  could  ease  the  frustra- 
tions  engendered  by  continuous  budgeting;  allow  legislators  more  time  for 
program  review  and  evaluation;  and,  even  with  provisions  for  changes  in 
emergencies,  promote  economic  stability.  It  might  also  make  a  small  con- 
tribution  to  the  goal  of  deficit  reduction  by  providing  less  opportunity  for 
modification  of  multiyear  agreements  and  by  allowing  the  gradual  imposi- 
tion  of  fiscal  changes.  ‘While  a  two-year  cycle  has  been  one  of  the  most 
widely  discussed  budget  process  reforms  during  the  past  decade, 
Washington’s  new  bipartisan  attention  to  streamlining  government  may 
make  the  present  the  perfect  time  to  adopt  this  reform.27 
Finally,  there  is  the  problem  of  the  expected  explosive  growth  in  entitle- 
ments.  Although  the  chairmen  of  Congress’s  Bipartisan  Commission  on 
Entitlement  and  Tax  Reform  (BCETR)  were  unable  to  win  support  for 
specific  policy  changes  in  1994,  Budget  Director  Alice  Rivlin  has  cor- 
rectly  observed  that  the  commission  played  “an  extremely  useful  role”  by 
“focusing  attention  on  the  big  problems  of  the  next  century”  (quoted 
in  Pear  1994).2a  To  make  future  progress  in  this  realm,  panels  with  nar- 
rower  agendas  than  that  of  the  BCETR  may  be  required,  for  example,  one 
commission  to  address  health  care  policy  and  another  to  study  the  via- 
bility  of  Social  Security.  (These  are  the  specific  policy  areas  where  we  can 
anticipate  our  most  significant  future  problems.)  As  economist  Max 
Sawicky  suggests,  work  in  both  areas  should  be  guided  by  two  principles: 
support  for  the  missions  of  existing  programs  and  commitment  to  reform 
that  is  structural,  not  merely  fiscal,  such  as  imposition  of  expenditure  caps 
(Sawicky  1994,  i-2j.29 
Conclusion 
The  idea  of  a  constitutional  amendment  requiring  a  balanced  budget  was 
recently  revived  in  Congress  as  part  of  the  Contract  with  America’s  Fiscal 
Responsibility  Act.  But  a  BBA  would  produce  only  more  fiscal  irresponsi- 
bility.  It  is  founded  on  a  misdirected  and  dangerous  economic  principle 
and  is  likely  to  bring  harm  to  the  political  system  once  put  into  practice. 
The  BBA  is  toxic,  not  tonic. 
38  Public Policy Brief The Baknued hdget  Amendment: Tkic,  Nor Tonic 
Today’s  federal  budget  needs  improvement  at  many  levels.  Fiscal  policy 
must  have  a  clearer  sense  of  direction;  tough  budget  choices  must  be  made; 
public  spending  should  be  more  efficient  and  have  a  stronger  investment 
orientation;  the  budget  process  warrants  streamlining;  and  the  projected 
growth  of  entitlements  spending  threatens  to  unleash  significant  structural 
deficits  in  the  years  ahead.  Some  reforms  that  address  these  problems  more 
directly  and  more  effectively  than  a  BBA  have  been  discussed  in  this  brief. 
As  a  first  step  toward  greater  fiscal  responsibility  and  more  rational  budget- 
ing,  legislators  in  Washington  should  follow  the  lead  of  the  states  and 
establish  a  narrowly  defied  federal  capital  budget.  The  appropriateness  of 
developing  a  multiyea  capital  improvements  plan,  of  financing  long-lived 
physical  assets  over  their  useful  life,  and  of  establishing  an  independent 
body  to  oversee  matters  such  as  the  development  of  (and  adherence  to) 
proper  depreciation  schedules  has  been  demonstrated  by  both  theory  and 
practice.  Indeed,  such  practices  are  common  in  both  the  public  and  pri- 
vate  sectors  at  home  and  abroad.  If  BBA  advocates  truly  want  the  U.S. 
government  to  follow  the  fiscally  responsible  practices  of  other  economic 
actors,  adoption  of  capital  budgeting  should  be  high  on  their  list  of  pro. 
posed  institutional  reforms. 
The  realities  of  a  BBA  have  been  clouded  by  rhetoric.  The  amendment 
cannot  ensure  budget  balance.  It  encourages  less  responsible  public  finan- 
cial  management.  It  will  nor  force  fiscal  restraint.  It  does  not  impose  upon 
the  federal  government  the  same  restraints  as  those  under  which  responsi- 
ble  households  and  firms  operate.  In  short,  it  represents  an  attempt  at  gov- 
eming  by  gimmick.  In  a  realm  as  fundamental  to  our  well-being  as  public 
budgeting  and  national  economic  policy,  Americans  deserve  much  more 
enlightened  leadership  and  a  far  more  serious  course  of  action  than  that 
embodied  in  the  BBA. 
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Notes 
1.  Federal  expenditures  were  about  18  percent  of  gmss  domestic  product  (GDP) 
in  the  second  half  of  the  1950s.  The  figure  was  just  under  11  percent  in  1934 
and  has  heen  about  23  percent  in  the  1990s  (EC&  Report  of  &e  President 
1994,362). 
2.  An  attempt  to  enact  a  balanced  budget  requirement  by  calling  for  a  constitu- 
tional  convention  also  stalled  in  the  1980s;  see  Snell  and  Mackey  (1994)  for 
more  on  that  effort.  A  constitutional  convention  must  be  requested  by  34 
states.  Amendments  originating  in  the  Congress  must  be  approved  by  two- 
thirds  of  the  membership  of  each  house  and  then  ratified  by 38  states. 
3.  The  overall  federal  deficit  for  fiscal  year  (FY)  1992  was  ultimately  placed  at 
$290.4  billion,  and  when  one  excludes  off-budget  receipts  and  outlays  (includ- 
ing  the  Social  Security  surplus)  that  number  rises  to  $340.5  billion.  Initial 
1992  forecasts  for  FY  1993  predicted  a  deficit  of  over  $400  billion  (Dewar  and 
Gugliotta  1992,  Al4). 
4.  More  than  400  economists  (including  seven  Nobel  Prize  winners)  signed  a 
statement  opposing  the  amendment  during  the  1992  debate;  see  “Economists 
Oppose Balanced  Budget  Amendment”  (1992). 
5.  On  the  matter  of  budget  execution,  this  proposal  stated  that  “Congr~s  and  the 
President  shall  ensure  that  acrual  outlays  do  not  exceed  the  outlays  set  forth” 
in  the  budget;  it  also  stated  that  Tongress  shall  enforce  and  implement  this 
Article  by  appropriate  legislation”  (House  Republican  Conference  1994a, 
2-3). 
G.  The  Senate  BBA  differed  from  the  amendment  that  passed  the  House  in  only 
one  respect:  Senator  added  language  designed  to  prevent  the  judiciary  from 
intervening  in  budget  matters  in  rhe  event  of  an  unbalanced  budget. 
7.  Another  prominent  economist  who  adheres  to  the  public  choice  perspective  of 
deficits  is Jzdmes M.  Buchanan.  Both  Friedman  and  Buchanan  are  Nobel  Prize 
winners. 
8.  According  to  Herbert  Stein  of  the  American  Enterprise  Institute,  BBA  sup- 
porters  do  not  understand  a  central  lesson  of  the  Gramm-Rudman  experiment: 
“it  is  Wle  to  set  ceilings  for  the  deficit  or  for  total  spending  without  prior 
awement  on  the  major  iines  of  the  policie  by  which  conformity  to  those  ceil- 
ings  is  to  be  implemented”  (Stein  1994,  5-6).  State  experience  underscore 
the  fact  that  a  BBA  requirement  alone  cannot  eliminate  deficits:  nine  states 
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with  balanced  budget  requirements  reported  at  least  one  deficit  for  the  period 
1990  through  1992  (General  Accounting  Of8ce  1993,35-36). 
For  a  similar  pctspective,  see  Suits  and  Fisher  (1985). 
For  a  discussion  of  the  room  for  off-budget  accounrs  under  the  BBA  passed  by 
the  House  in  January  1995,  see  Tofel  (  1995). 
For  a  discussion  of  the  problems  ass&ated  with  deferred  maintenance  and  a 
policy  proposal  to  finance  the  nation’s  public  infrastructure  investments,  see 
Kegan  (  1994b). 
See  also  Regan  (1995),  who  notes  that  at  least  12  states  used  accounting  gim- 
micks  to  close  20  percent  or  more  of  their  budget  gap  in  recent  years. 
According  to  Michael  Hurd,  an  expert  on  the  economics  of  aging,  health  care 
costs  in  2020  will  rise  to  between  23  and  34  percent  of  GDP,  while  the  number 
of  retirees  per  100  workers  is  expected  to  rise  from  today’s  30  to  between  41 
and  67  by  2040  (“The  Economics  of  Aging”  1994,  2).  The  present  rate  of 
growth  in  Medicare  and  Medicaid  expenditures  is  15  percent  per  year. 
According  to  former  Congre=ionai  Budget  mce  Director  Kudolph  Penner, 
Congas  already  takes  into  account  some  dynamic  fiscal  policy  effects:  “It’s 
not  a  matter  of  dynamic  or  not  dynamic  but  how  dynamic*  (quoted  in  Kubin 
1994,3503). 
Roberts  adds,  “Moreover,  as  far  as  I  can  ascertain,  no  supply-side  economist 
inside  or  outside  the  Reagan  Administration  ever  said  that  tax  cuts  would  pay 
for  themselves”  (Roberts  1991.24). 
For  more  on  the  problems  of  judicial  enforcement,  see  Bork  (1990),  Strauss 
(1995),  and  Dellinger  (1995). 
The  smte  balanced  budget  requirements  mentioned  earlier  in  this  brief  refer 
only  to  operating  budgets.  For  more  on  the  state  experience  with  such  require- 
ments,  see  Gold  (1992). 
For  the  purpae  of  capital  budgeting,  public  investments  (or  capital  expendi- 
tures)  have  traditionally  been  defined  as  nonroutine  outlays  involving  physical 
facilities  that  have  a  useful  economic  life  of  more  than  one  year.  Examples 
include  construction  of  roads,  utility  systems,  buildings,  and  canals  and  pur- 
chase  of  major  pieces  of  equipment,  such  as  garbage  trucks,  police  cars,  and 
bulldozers  (Doss  1987,60). 
It  has  been  argued,  for  example,  that  a  balanced  federal  budget  in  1993,  when 
the  U.S.  economy  was  recovering  from  recession,  would  have  cut  that  year’s 
business  profits  almost  in  half  (S  Jay  Levy  1994,  2).  A  U.S.  Treasury 
Department  study,  meanwhile,  concluded  that  a  BBA  in  effect  at  the  peak  of 
that  most  recent  recmion  would  have  added  1.5  million  people  to  the  ranks  of 
the  unemployed  and  would  have  raised  the  unemployment  rate  from  its  actual 
level  of  7.7  percent  to  nearly  9  percent  (Rubin  1995). 
Deficits  designed  to  of&et  cyclical  downturns  do  not  necessarily  require  discre- 
tionary  fisca1  policy  action.  Automatic  stabilizers  have  been  providing  corn- 
pensarory  spending  for  decades. 
Mimky  is  one  economist  who  has  not  ignored  the  financial  system  implica- 
tions  of  a  BBA.  For  a  contrast,  SW  Senate  testimony  in  favor  of  the  balanced 
budget  amendment  by  Social  Security  expert  Robert  J.  Myers.  Myem’s  state- 
ment,  which  identifies  the  continuing  exisrencc  of  federal  budget  deficits  as 
“the  mmt  serious  threat  to  Social  Security,”  proudly  mentions  that  the  pro- 
gram’s  surplus  now  totals  nearly  $500  bI1  I  ion  and  is  invested  in  “interest- 








bearing  government  bonds”  (Myers  1995,2).  Minsky’s view  is not  that  govcm- 
ment  deficits  and  debt  are  always  a  good  thing.  Rather,  it  is that  our  intensely 
financial  economy  “can  have  too  little  as  well  a  too  much  government  debt” 
(Minsky  1995,4). 
While  some  legislators  have  proposed  incorporating  a  capital-budgeting  provi- 
sion  into  the  BBA,  this  proposal  has  never  received  much  congressional  sup- 
port.  The  BBA  pased  by  the  House  in  January  1995  does  not  contain  such  a 
prnvision.  Indeed,  amendments  with  such  provisions  were  defeated  soundly  in 
1994  and  1995. 
Some  have  suggested  rhat  counrercyclical  action  could  be  retained  under  a 
BBA  if  the  fedeml  government  ran  budget  surpluses  regularly  XI that  surpluses 
could  6111 toward  zero  during  downturns.  But  fulLemployment  budgeting  is 
superior  to  this  approach  in  two  respects.  First,  the  political  dangers  of  a  BBA 
still  remain  relevant  to  the  surplus  approach;  6~  fewer  (and  less acute)  political 
dangem  would  be  associated  with  full-employment  budgeting,  partly  because 
there  would  be  no  constitutional  statement.  Indeed,  many  political  problems 
might  be  especially  significant  under  the  surplus  approach  since  the  goal  is not 
merely  a  zero  deficit  but  the  more  difficult  to  reach  objective  of  a  budget  sur- 
plus.  Second,  the  surplus  approach  aumes  that  high  employment  can  be 
obmined  regularly  without  deficits.  While  full-employment  budgeting  does  not 
exclude  this  a$  a  po.&ility,  it  puts  the  goal  of  balancing  the  economy  (high 
employment)  before  the  matter  of  balancing  the  budget. 
The  FEBGA’s  4.0  percent  figure  reflects  a  rounding  up  f?om  the  3.8  percent 
atimate  of  cyclical  unemployment. 
As  with  full-employment  budgeting,  political  dangers  of  a  BBA  are  al.so avoid- 
ed  by  enactment  of  a  detailed,  multiyear  plan. 
The  council  is  aware  that  under  an  investment-budgeting  system  that  puts 
invesrmenrs  “off  budget”  legislators  might  feel  pressured  to  mask  large  budget 
deficits  by  classifying  nearly  all  public  expenditures  as  investments.  A  unified 
budget  deficit  calculation  is  retained  in  their  investment-budget  proposal  for 
precisely  this  reason.  An  alternative  approach  (which  will  be  discussed  shortly) 
is offered  by  capital  budgeting,  a  system  that  addresses  this  problem  by employ- 
ing  a very  narrow  definition  of  capital  outlays. 
For  more  on  biennial  budgeting,  including  evidence  of  bipartisan  support  for 
this  reform,  see  Whalen  (19?4). 
The  entitlements  commission  was  headed  by  Senator  Bob  Kerrey 
(D-Nebraska)  and  Senator  John  Dmforth  (R-Missouri). 
The  1983  panel  convened  to  address  imminent  problems  in  the  financing  of 
Social  Security  demonstrates  that  a  bipartisan  effort  focused  on  problems  in  a 
single  policy  area  can  indeed  be  effective.  More  recent  commission  successes 
include  the  work  of  the  Base Closu~  and  Realignment  Commission. 
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